On the Back of a Tiger: Deconstructive
Possibilities in ‘Evidence of Me’[1]
[This paper was originally published in Archives
and Manuscripts, the journal of the Australian Society of
Archivists, v.29:1 (2001). It is reprinted here with the kind permission of
the author and publisher. RB]
This article offers a deconstructive
reading of Sue McKemmish’s ‘Evidence of me ...’, published in 1996 in Archives and
Manuscripts. McKemmish’s essay is of seminal
importance, being the first (and still the only) sustained application of a
recordkeeping conceptual framework to the realm of personal recordkeeping. The
reading shows McKemmish breaching the boundaries of an enchanted wilderness for
too long neglected by the recordkeeping professions. McKemmish, it is argued,
demonstrates that in this wilderness we are hanging on the back of a tiger.
Using deconstructive techniques, Harris attempts to move into the many openings
marked by McKemmish and to point out others missed by her. He suggests that the
recordkeeping framework deployed by McKemmish needs to be reimagined in order
to accommodate the realities of a realm fraught with complexity.
Nature
threw away the keys and woe to the fateful curiosity which might be able for a
moment to look out and down through a crevice in the chamber of consciousness,
and discover that man [sic] indifferent to his own ignorance, is resting on the
pitiless, the greedy, the insatiable, the murderous, and, as it were, hanging
in dreams on the back of a tiger.
Friedrich
Nietzsche[2]
…the
passivity of genesis and of synthesis invites a sustained meditation on the
ashes of evidence and the evidence of ash. Evidence is evidently to be mourned.
David
Farrell Krell[3]
To
locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry
it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident
hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is
always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell.
Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak[4]
I
am very fond of everything that I deconstruct in my own manner; the texts I
want to read from the deconstructive point of view are texts I like, with that
impulse of identification which is indispensable for reading.
Jacques Derrida[5]
In 1996 Archives and Manuscripts published an important (and deservedly
prize-winning) article by Sue McKemmish, entitled ‘Evidence of me…’.[6]
It is a seminal work, over four years later retaining both its freshness and the
urgency of its challenge. It is elegantly written, evinces a close reading of
numerous texts both ‘fictional’ and ‘non-fictional’ and, crucially, offers a
sustained application of a recordkeeping conceptual framework to a records
space (personal recordkeeping) usually avoided by the articulators of such
frameworks. It marks, both in terms of McKemmish’s own thinking and of
recordkeeping discourse, a significant stretching (in some cases a reimagining)
of core concepts. Indeed, one could go further and argue that McKemmish enters
terrain which at the time was virgin in archival discourse; terrain which
McKemmish’s intervention has sadly not encouraged others in the discourse to
enter. Of course, in broader discourses around ‘archive’ there have been and are
intrepid explorers of personal recordkeeping – many writers of fiction, some of
them read by McKemmish; philosophers such as Jacques Derrida; interrogators of
the impact on writing (and communication, and human relationships) of email and
other forms of electronic communication; and so on.
‘Evidence of me…’ is at once marginal and
anything but marginal. In a sense McKemmish is beyond the margins (in archival
discourse), from where she calls colleagues to join her in the task of
extending margins. She is at pains to emphasise the exploratory nature of her
endeavour. At various points she flags issues requiring further research, and
in the article’s final paragraph suggests a possible ‘research brief’. In this
essay I attempt to heed her call, not by engaging the imperative for further
research, but by unfolding the possibilities offered by deconstruction in this
space beyond the margins.
The term ‘deconstruction’ is most
commonly associated with Jacques Derrida, who coined it and remains its most
prominent articulator and exponent.[7]
It is difficult, arguably impossible, to say what deconstruction is. It is not
a philosophy, nor an episteme, nor a paradigm. If anything, it is a mode of
interrogation, a style of discourse, a way of reading. Let me attempt to
suggest its contours by observing Derrida ‘in the archive’. His most direct
engagement with the archive as concept was in the celebrated (in some quarters,
including many archival quarters, reviled) Archive
Fever: A Freudian Impression (1996). But in a sense all Derrida’s work is
about the archive. He converses with it, mines it, interrogates it, plays in
it, extends it, creates it, imagines it, is imagined by it. It is impossible to
speak of Derrida without also speaking of the archive. It is impossible to
speak – now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century – of the archive
without also speaking of Derrida. Of course, all these assertions assume a
concept associated with this word, this noun, ‘archive’. An assumption Derrida
questions. Not only are there numerous competing concepts associated with the
word, but from within the word itself – coming from behind linguistics or
semantics or etymology, coming from the very processes of archiving – there is
a troubling of meaning. But however we understand the word ‘archive’, it
remains true to say that all Derrida’s work, in a sense, is about the archive.
And in sense and sensing, for his work – the sense of Derrida, the non-sense of
Derrida – insistently, searingly, joyously, embraces the dimensions of reason,
emotion and instinct contained in the word ‘sense’.
Derrida’s work can be typified as an
extended reading, or rewriting, of what others have written. Always the canon
of Western philosophy and literature, the tradition, the archive, is his point
of departure.[8] In the
archive he generates archive, opening the future in the past. He reads, and
reads again, the canonical texts. Out of his reading comes new text, which is
old in its newness. He discloses – for himself and for all readers of text,
readers of archive – that we are always and already embedded in ‘archi-text’.[9]
There is nothing outside of the archive.[10]
And yet, at the same time, in what could
be called an aporetics of being, or of becoming, everything is outside of the
archive. In everything known is the unknown, the unknowable, the unarchivable,
the other. And every other is wholly other. This is not so much – though it is
this – a marking of reason’s limits. It is more a disclosing of structural
resistance to closure. Every circle of human knowing and experience is always
already breached – breached by the unnameable, by an (un)certain divine
particularity, by a coming which must always be coming. In his more recent
work, Derrida has opened (more fully) what could be called religious and autobiographical
dimensions to his explorations.[11]
These dimensions coalesce in an ever closer heeding to the call of the other,
more precisely of otherness. In heeding closely, he has been drawn, in one
movement, to the otherness outside and the otherness inside – the otherness of
the self, or of the selves, an otherness marking and marked by, but never
found, in the personal archive.
The personal archive. Personal
recordkeeping. Evidence of me. This is the terrain in which I intend to move in
this essay. A terrain broached in archival discourse (narrowly defined) by
McKemmish. My movement will be informed (consciously) by three dimensions.
Firstly, a deconstructive reading of McKemmish’s ‘Evidence of me…’. Secondly, a
further opening (for I believe that McKemmish has begun the work of opening)
into personal recordkeeping for the energies of deconstruction. And thirdly, an
invitation to readers to engage in the deconstruction of my movement.
In the article’s opening three
paragraphs, McKemmish outlines the analytical framework she will deploy. For
her, personal recordkeeping is a way of ‘evidencing’ and ‘memorialising’ a
life. It is a ‘kind of witnessing’. The ‘capacity to witness’ hinges on the
‘functionality’ of the archive generated by this witnessing – the degree to
which a person ‘systematically’ goes about the ‘business’ of creating and
capturing records, ordering them in relation to each other, placing them in the
context of related activities, keeping and discarding them – in short,
‘organising them to function as long-term memory of significant activities and
relationships’. Within this framework McKemmish indicates that she will explore
the factors that condition recordkeeping behaviour and seek to identify the
range of ‘personal recordkeeping cultures’.
Before she begins (and one could go
further back, to other writings of hers which inform the moves she will make in
‘Evidence of me…’), she establishes that she is outside the evidence-memory
dichotomy which informs so much recordkeeping discourse. The record is at once
evidence and memory, but not in any reductionist ‘two sides of a coin’ way.
Both concepts are infused with fresh possibility by their configuration within
the category ‘witnessing’. This McKemmish has already marked in her choice of
title, a quote from Graham Swift’s Ever
After. Later, as she engages Swift’s text, it becomes clear that for Swift
‘evidence’ is hospitable to the dynamics of storytelling, which bring with them
‘mysteries’, ‘fantasticalities’, ‘wonders’ and ‘grounds for astonishment’.
Although she does not spell it out, McKemmish flags her distance from narrow
‘record-as-evidence’ formulations.
What might a spelling out, or better, a
probing beyond the surface layers, reveal? That witnessing is a terrain without
horizon, always stretching beyond evidencing and memorialising, embracing
(without hard boundaries between them) interrogating, constructing, resisting,
imagining, narrating, fabricating, hiding (from), forgetting, healing, and so
on (and on). That witnessing, contrary to its conventional usage, cannot submit
to an economy of proof, certainty and information. As Derrida has said of
‘testimony’, ‘there is no testimony that does not structurally imply in itself
the possibility of fiction, simulacra, dissimulation, lie, and perjury’.[12]
That witnessing can only be squeezed into the claustrophobic space of
recordkeeping functionality at a price.
Why should the capacity to witness
through personal records depend on the degree of ‘functionality’? What of the possibility
that an ‘anti-functionality’ or a ‘dysfunctionality’ is as legitimate a mode of
witnessing? Does not the total destruction of all documentary traces carry a
fund of meanings? Or the deliberate ‘decontextualising’ of correspondence by
preserving only fragments stuck in a scrapbook? In the final section of the
article McKemmish addresses the question of archival intervention in the domain
of personal recordkeeping. I think she makes many valid points, all of them
informed by a commitment to promoting functionality. But she does not explore
what is for me by far the most interesting dimension – the resistance to
functionality in this domain. What underlies these resistances? Why do even
archivists resist ‘system’ and ‘order’ and ‘business’ with their personal
archives? What is this ‘dysfunctionality’ saying to us? And, to shift the focus
somewhat, what of the possibility that a poem about a life can carry far more
meanings than a whole archive of personal records? Does Leonard Cohen’s song
‘Suzanne’ not do for his relationship with Suzanne Verdal what no volume of
archival records can approximate? What does that say about the value of
evidence in records? And about the collecting priorities of archivists?
Questions not posed. A narrowing of a
scope of enquiry. The paying of a price. The notion of recordkeeping
functionality works against McKemmish’s broad understanding of witnessing in
records. It pulls her towards a privileging of ‘evidencing’ over other
dynamics, and towards a narrower representation of evidence as an authentic,
reliable ‘capturing’ of process. Let me offer two examples here to illustrate
this. On page 30, McKemmish suggests that ‘archivists can analyse what is
happening in personal recordkeeping in much the same way as they analyse corporate
recordkeeping’. Specifically, archivists ‘can analyse socially assigned roles
and related activities and draw conclusions about what records individuals in
their personal capacity capture as evidence of these roles and activities’. A
second example is to be found on page 35. Having related how the writer Patrick
White moved from being ‘remembrancer’ to ‘recordkeeper’ in relation to his own
life, McKemmish asserts that ‘for White too, there eventually came a time when
“privacy was no longer the issue” and carrying forward evidence of his life
beyond his own lifetime was what “mattered most”’. This strains against
McKemmish’s own formulation of remembrancing working within all recordkeeping.
And I have to wonder if White, in conceding to the preservation of records, was
not more concerned about a different form of remembrancing, of witnessing, of
carrying forward stories of his life.
The opening paragraphs of ‘Evidence of
me…’ raise two other areas of concern for me. Firstly, the notion of a range of
‘personal recordkeeping cultures’. That McKemmish does not delimit the spaces
in which she will seek this range of cultures sets off alarm bells for me. Will
she be seeking it in the present, the now, or in past presents? Will she be
seeking it across the globe? Or in the Western world? Or in Australia? In
certain sectors of society? The questions are endless and, as I will attempt to
point out below, they haunt the whole article.
A final preliminary alarm bell is
ringing. McKemmish’s stated intention is to explore the factors that condition
the recordkeeping behaviour of individuals. But what about the equally valid
and important question, ‘how does recordkeeping condition a life’? Numerous
scholars have studied the impact of writing (in the narrowest sense) on
societies. As numerous are the scholars who have studied the impact of new
technologies – from cameras to typewriters to the telegraph to computers – for
recording and/or communicating ‘the event’. Arguably none has interrogated the
recording process as profoundly as Jacques Derrida. He argues that the trace,
the archive, is not simply a recording, a capturing, a reflection, of the
event. Nor is it merely a construction of the event. It shapes the event. ‘The
archivization produces as much as it records the event.’[13]
So that the questions ‘what factors condition personal recordkeeping?’ and ‘how
does recordkeeping condition a life?’ hang together, unfold out of one another.
Any enquiry into recordkeeping which privileges one, or omits one, invites impoverishment.
Throughout ‘Evidence of me…’ McKemmish
quotes records and people from a variety of contexts. The span and richness of
the variety is impressive. This to illustrate a spectrum of ‘recordkeeping
behaviour’, from ‘obsessive recordkeeper’ to ‘remembrancer’; from the one who
diligently documents process, the event – with respect for functionality – to
the one who relies entirely on ‘memory’. McKemmish’s account is seamless and
compelling - a metanarrative inviting deconstruction. For if deconstruction has
an obsession it is with the seams, the ruptures, the frayed ends which are always already there. McKemmish
gives us a glimpse of some of them. For instance, the category ‘obsessive
recordkeeper’ carries a pejorative meaning. The portrait of Ann-Clare – an
archetypal recordkeeper – in the novel The
Grass Sister is ‘disturbing’. Here is a strong suggestion of dysfunction. A
dysfunction nestling right in the heart of recordkeeping functionality.
McKemmish opens for us a whole realm of possibility. And of course McKemmish
has already placed the spectrum under erasure with her embrace of recordkeeping
as ‘a kind of witnessing’ – so that memory is always teasing the most obsessive
recordkeeping; and the most committed remembrancer is engaging, and engaged by,
a kind of recordkeeping.
These are important glimpses. But hidden
by the spectrum’s appearance of seamlessness are a myriad layers and fractures.
What are the differences – and they are without number – determined or informed
by ‘things’ such as gender, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on?
What are the differences between cultures (in the broadest sense)? And
countries? And historical ‘moments’? McKemmish, I am suggesting, is
underplaying ‘context’. Her numerous examples of records and recordkeepers tend
to float free of space, time, and other contextual layerings. Let me mention
just two in order to suggest the consequences. On page 38 she quotes a long
extract from Edmund White’s ‘Esthetics and Loss’ in which he places ‘memorialisation’
and ‘bearing witness’ in the context of gay experience. This to support a
single sentence by McKemmish: ‘In Edmund White’s writings there is a fine sense
of the role of personal recordkeeping linked to issues of cultural identity and
memory, and to the instinct to witness.’ A whole corridor of doors marked by
White are left unopened by McKemmish. For instance, are there gay specificities
in the realm of recordkeeping? How have these specificities changed over time?
Do they differ from country to country? What are the obstacles to straight
readings (especially of the most intimate) gay recordings? How do
criminalisation and other forms of oppression impact on the personal
recordkeeping of gay people? How do these recordkeeping dynamics impact on gay
experiences?
The other example is McKemmish’s passing
reference to Australian Aboriginal experience on pages 38 and 39. Again, the
extent and the specificities of what is a rich tapestry are not explored. The
considerable Aboriginal challenge to Western notions of ‘the record’ are left
unmarked. In fact, one could go further and argue that the brief passage
offered by McKemmish suggests (though this is surely not her intention) that
Aboriginal people need (white) institutional intervention in order to help them
remember and evidence their pasts.
As I have already intimated, the
‘recordkeeping cultures’ of what we could call ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’
societies and communities are not featured in McKemmish’s account. Nor does she
address forms of the record – orality, tattoos, facial markings and so on –
regarded as more or less ‘informal’ within recordkeeping discourse (in radical
formulations they would be excluded altogether from the category ‘record’). Her
focus is intently on the ‘formal’ record – positioned, in the main, in what we
could call a societal (and Western, or global hub) mainstream. This focus, I
want to suggest, is conditioned by McKemmish’s utilisation of recordkeeping
functionality as a framework.
Not that McKemmish does not provide an
opening for a wider focus. She does so by including remembrancing as a form of
recordkeeping. But clearly, further exploration of personal recordkeeping by
archivists must take this opening boldly. Such exploration should avoid a functionality
straightjacket. Equally, it should avoid narrow conceptualisations of
‘recordness’. Here Jacques Derrida has much to offer. In numerous writings, but
particularly in his seminal Archive
Fever: A Freudian Impression, Jacques Derrida unfolds the structure of
recording, of archiving, as involving a trace (text, information) being
consigned to a substrate, a place (and it can be a virtual place) of
consignation. So that for Derrida the archive is a conjoining of trace and
substrate – writing on paper, painting on rock, cut on skin, even a configuring
of brain particles in the psychic apparatus. Does the latter mean that
‘archive’ and ‘memory’ are conflated? No. The need for exteriority (ultimately)
separates ‘archive’ from ‘memory’:
…since the archive doesn’t consist simply
in remembering, in living memory, in anamnesis; but in consigning, in
inscribing a trace in some external location – there is no archive without some
location, that is, some space outside. Archive is not a living memory. It’s a location
– that’s why the political power of the archons is so essential in the
definition of the archive. So that you need the exteriority of the place in
order to get something archived.[14]
For a story, a memory, to become archive,
it must have exteriority. And consignation to the psychic apparatuses of others
constitutes an exteriorisation. So that the stories and memories of
collectivities are archive. As are the stories and memories transmitted by an
individual to any other. They are, in recordkeeping terminology, evidence of
transactions. (Thus, for instance, the legal status of ‘verbal contracts’ in
many societies.) It could be argued, of course, that the ‘unconscious’ is an
‘external space’ within an individual’s psychic apparatus – so that traces in
the individual unconscious could be regarded as archive. But that is an
argument for another day.[15]
Derridean thinking opens huge chasms
under McKemmish’s account of personal recordkeeping. At this point I mark just
three vertiginous lines emerging from the passage quoted above. First, to
reiterate what I’ve already said, McKemmish risks marginalising orality, that
record, that archive, consigned to a dispersed substrate no one can ‘see’,
which leads to a risk of marginalising whole layerings of personal
recordkeeping, and of marginalising whole recordkeeping collectivities.
Secondly, ‘memory’ – and ‘remembrancing’ – cannot be subsumed unproblematically
under the category ‘recordkeeping’. And thirdly, her account touches only
briefly on the fundamental issue of power – a single direct engagement with the
issue is recounted below. Derrida argues that consignation, structurally,
involves the exercise of power, what he calls ‘archontic power’. Power in
relation to both the process and the place of consignation. In all archiving
then – the diarist making an entry, the rock painter at work, the person
sending an email to a friend, the parent sharing a family tale with the
children – archontic power is in play. The challenge for those who would follow
McKemmish into this terrain fraught with complexity is to negotiate these
chasms.
Arguably the boldest, most radical, move
made by McKemmish is her suggestion that personal recordkeeping (amongst other
things) is a playground of fictions. She quotes passages from Anthony Giddens
and Graham Swift in which both writers stress the centrality of narrative, and
thus of fictionalisation, to human identity. For Giddens, ‘The individual’s
biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the
day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate
events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing
“story” about the self.’[16]
So that the individual’s recordkeeping – in the writing of a journal, the
writing and keeping of letters – is contaminated by the human instinct to tell
story and to create identity. For McKemmish Swift’s novel Waterland ‘provides an insight into the way Gidden’s “narrative of
the self” might merge into the narrative of the tribe – and eventually
contribute to the yarn that is history itself’ (page 37).
Recordkeeping as a way of keeping the
narrative going. History as yarn. Here McKemmish is challenging the dominant
position in recordkeeping discourse – indeed, the dominant position in all
archival discourse - which will concede only that recordkeepers might work with
the residues of storytellers and might serve storytellers; but that who
recordkeepers are and what they do is neatly partitioned from the realm of
story. It is a pity that McKemmish does not elaborate her challenge; that she
does not draw from a discourse far broader than Giddens and Swift; that she
does not weave the challenge into her analytical framework, explore its
explosive implications for the concept of ‘witnessing’. But she has given us a
crucial marker.
In all that recordkeepers do they are
working with ‘context’, continually locating it, constructing it, figuring and
refiguring it. And they do this work primarily through the medium of narrative.
There is analysis and processing and labelling and listing and quantifying and
so on, but essentially the recordkeeping intervention has to do with
storytelling. Recordkeepers tell stories about stories, they tell stories with
stories. And narrativity – as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Hayden White
and others have demonstrated – as much as it might strive to work with actual
events, processes, structures and characters, in its form – structurally –
brings a certain fictionalisation of what Paul Ricoeur calls these immediate
referents.[17] For the
form of narrativity – like all forms – is not merely a neutral container. It
shapes, even determines, the narrative content in significant ways. Every
narrative construction of the past is by definition creative, a work of the
imagination – it recalls referents which in all their particularity, their
uniqueness, are irrecoverable, and which flow in a chaotic open-endedness. The
construction gives to them a shape, a pattern, a closure. So that all ‘non-fictional’
discourse employing narrative inevitably invites ‘fiction’ in. A hard boundary
between ‘non-fiction’ and ‘fiction’, then, is unsustainable. Narrators of
‘non-fiction’, including recordkeepers, no matter how dedicated they are to
‘facts’ and to empirical methods, are confronted by documentary records,
collective memories and individual memories shaped by the dance of remembering,
forgetting and imagining. And that dance whirls in their own heads as they
construct their representations of the past. History slides into story, reality
into fiction. So that Jacques Derrida can speak of ‘the meshes of the net
formed by the limits between fiction
and testimony, which are also interior
each to the other. The net’s texture remains loose, unstable, permeable.’[18]
In a short section entitled ‘Killing the
memory…’, McKemmish talks about a pattern of records destruction in human
conflict. She concludes:
On one level such actions are aimed at
ensuring the victors against future claims by the peoples they hope to
dispossess. At a more profound level, destroy the memory – the evidence that
those peoples ever lived in that place – and those peoples, those cultures never existed at all (pages 39 and 40).
Here she gives us an extreme example of archontic
power being exercised. It is also an extreme instance of evidence to be
mourned. Elsewhere (in the article’s second footnote) McKemmish quotes Tolstoy
saying of his diaries: ‘The diaries are
me’. In both cases she is marking profound levels (or spaces) but declining to
enter them. Specifically, she is declining to explore the implications of these
statements for our conceptualisation of ‘the record’. And these implications –
to my ears anyhow – are crying out to be heard. For most archival discourse
assumes a structural separation between ‘the event’ and ‘the trace of event’.
But these statements (by McKemmish and McKemmish-through-Tolstoy) – so fleeting
it is almost as though they were not made – conflate ‘event’ and ‘trace’ which
reveals a yawning conceptual chasm beneath us.
Let me just suggest here the scope of the
chasm with the beginning of a vertiginous inventory. If ‘event’ and ‘trace’ are
not ultimately separable, then ‘me’ separate from ‘my traces’ is not all of ‘me’.
‘My traces’ are not merely ‘evidence’ of ‘me’, they are part of who I am. As
much as I create ‘my traces’, they create ‘me’ (as Derrida puts it, ‘the
archivization produces as much as it records the event’). ‘My traces’ are
constructions, always demanding deconstruction. ‘Me’ is a construction, always
demanding deconstruction. There is nothing outside of text, of ‘trace’;
everything is always already outside of text.[19]
‘Evidence’ must always be mourned, for its preservation carries the very
possibility of its reduction to ashes. ‘Evidence’ must always be mourned, for
it is the ashes of the ‘always
already outside’. Perhaps ‘provenance’ does not ‘lie’ in any particular ‘locus’
(cf. pages 35–6 of ‘Evidence of me…’) – perhaps it is – and always was – shattered
and shattering.
And so on, and on and on. I terminate the
inventory here before vertigo becomes overwhelming. My point is simply that
McKemmish opens a door on the unlimited fecund spaces carried by the concepts
‘record’ and ‘archive’. She opens a door on whole streams of philosophical and
broader discourse. For those who would follow her, the imperative is to walk
through the door.
A brief observation before drawing this
section to a close. On page 36 of ‘Evidence of me…’ McKemmish makes passing comment
on ‘the photograph’ in the context of the documenting work done by professional
photographers. Another door inviting entry. What of amateur photography? The
importance to personal recordkeeping of the family snapshot? What of moving
images? The home video? The impact of digital technologies? The questions are
legion. But I would argue that the most significant questions draw us back to
the connection between ‘the event and the trace’. For McKemmish’s comments are
bounded by a notion of the photographic image as a ‘catching’ or ‘freezing’ of
the moment. The trace as a reflection of the event. The trace structurally
separated from the event. What fecund spaces are opened by the possibility of
their conflation? To what extent is the trace a construction of the event? Can
the trace not create the event? Is there not a sense in which the trace is the event; in which the photographic
image is the moment?
Everything I have said thus far assumes the boundaries of ‘personal recordkeeping’ to be self-evident; and, in particular, assumes the boundary between ‘personal recordkeeping’ and ‘corporate recordkeeping’ to be clear, stable and hard. In doing so I follow McKemmish. But of course the boundary between these two recordkeeping ‘spaces’ is far from untroubled. On the one hand, organisations struggle to prevent employees maintaining more or less informal records systems which run parallel to the formal records systems. They struggle to prevent employees using the former to conduct personal recordkeeping – here I need only flag, for example, the huge challenge posed by email. They struggle, particularly in the electronic realm, to define what constitutes an organisational record. On the other hand, individuals outside the workplace find it difficult to wear a single hat when dealing with a record. So often the ‘personal’ slides into the ‘professional’, ‘associational’ or ‘organisational’.
Shadowing the boundary – exceeding it but
always implicated in it – is the separation between the ‘personal’ and the
‘public’. This is a separation every individual makes, but it is determined by
an indeterminable and shifting context of cultural and societal layerings.
There is a huge literature on this phenomenon, which I merely flag here. Just
three points to illustrate the implications for any attempt to place boundaries
around personal recordkeeping. Firstly, we need to consider the impact of
freedom of information and protection of privacy legislation on how individuals
keep records and on what records they can bring into their (personal)
recordkeeping spaces. Secondly, electronic recordkeeping is at once increasing
concern about privacy and drawing the ‘private’ out of previously hidden
spaces. And thirdly, more and more individuals are working out of their home environments
- for themselves, for a single employer, or for a shifting configuration of
employers. In this scenario even the most committed devotee of functionality is
confronted by a considerable challenge.
So, the boundary between ‘personal
recordkeeping’ and ‘corporate recordkeeping’ is troubled. It is unclear,
shifting and soft. What brings us to this conclusion – to some extent – is
deconstruction. But deconstruction would take us further. It invites us to
consider the boundary between these recordkeeping domains which is interior each to the other. On the one
hand, consider the degree to which every corporate record bears the imprint of
the individual. The individual telling his or her own story. On the other,
consider the degree to which every personal record bears the imprint of what
Derrida calls archi-text. The individual telling his or her own story always
within a multi-layered – including organisational layerings – conceptual
framework. A meta-archive shaping all archive. As Foucault argues: ‘the archive
is first the law of what can be said’.[20]
And when it can be said; how it can be said.
In ‘Evidence of me…’ McKemmish breaches
the boundaries of an enchanted wilderness area for too long neglected by the
recordkeeping professions. There she shows us that we are hanging in dreams on
the back of a (very) wild tiger. The realm of personal recordkeeping, to use
non-metaphoric language, is one fraught with complexity. More than this, she
suggests – gently, indirectly – that all recordkeeping domains are equally
complex. We might think – with our ready definitions, legislation, policies,
standards, programs and systems - that we can bring the wilderness under
control, that we can tame the tiger. In my reading, McKemmish is arguing that
this would be to fool ourselves.
Some might point to the final section of
‘Evidence of me…’ as evidence of McKemmish advocating a strategy for ‘taming’.
In this section she explores the possibilities for archival intervention in
personal recordkeeping and proposes a research brief. I read her differently.
Certainly, there is evidence of a certain ambivalence in her thinking. Given
the daring conceptual challenges she poses earlier in the piece, her proposals
for further research are somewhat cautious. They tend to shy from danger. And,
as I have already indicated, her vision is troubled by adherence to the notion
of recordkeeping functionality. She quotes approvingly, for instance, Chris
Hurley calling for a process ‘to identify and articulate the functional requirements
for personal recordkeeping and for socio-historical evidence’ (page 41).
However, her respect for wilderness is unswerving. While archivists must move
beyond passivity, ‘we may just have to accept that archivists cannot play much
of a direct role in these process-based aspects of personal recordkeeping’
(page 41). An appropriate role, she suggests, is more about promoting
awareness, purveying concepts, crossing disciplinary boundaries, engaging
creatively, expanding conceptual frameworks, breathing life into discourses
grown weary:
What archivists
can do is to further develop and share their understandings of the role of
personal recordkeeping in our society and the ‘place’ of the personal archive
in the collective archives. It may be that studying the personal archive in the
way suggested in this article will provide us with insights that enable us to
understand recordkeeping per se as a social system, a perspective that is often
missing in studies of corporate recordkeeping (page 41).
I have attempted to take McKemmish’s analysis a step further. Specifically I have endeavoured, using deconstructive techniques, to move into the many openings she has marked and to point out others which she missed. Or, to return to the metaphor of the tiger, I have attempted to disclose more fully the tiger in all its frightening splendour, with its imperilled, dreaming rider. Like McKemmish, I offer no blueprint for managing danger. No solution. But I am arguing that the instincts to tame, to destroy, or to flee promise impoverishment. And I am suggesting (merely suggesting, for establishing the basis for the assertion is an argument for another day) that the archival instinct (and it has to be an instinct bigger than the merely ‘archival’) is to re-spect (look again at) wildness, to look – with passion – for ways of conserving wilderness. In ‘Evidence of me…’ McKemmish allows this instinct space to play. Of course, it could be argued that wilderness areas are best (con)served by preventing breaches. Another argument for another day…
ENDNOTES
[1] I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to
Adrian Cunningham, Kerry Harris, Ethel Kriger and Sue McKemmish for their
readings of the first draft of this essay. Their insights and shared passion led
to a comprehensive rewrite. Any flaws which remain are my own responsibility.
[2] Oscar Levy (ed.), The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, New York, 1964, vol. 3
part 2, pp. 175–6.
[3] David Farrell Krell, The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art and Affirmation in the
Thought of Jacques Derrida, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, p.
133.
[4] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Translator’s
Preface’, in Jacques Derrida, Of
Grammatology, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. xxvii.
[5] Jacques Derrida, in Christie McDonald
(ed.), The Ear of the Other:
Otobiography, Transference, Translation, Schocken Books, 1985, p. 87.
[6] Sue McKemmish, ‘Evidence of me…’, Archives and Manuscripts, vol. 24, no.
1, May 1996, pp. ***.
[7] Other notable ‘deconstructionists’ include
Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Blanchot and Gayatri Spivak.
[8] In Edmund
Husserl’s Origin of Geometry (1978), for instance, Derrida engages Husserl
and Joyce. In Glas (1986) he engages
Hegel and Genet. The Gift of Death (1995)
is a conversation with Kierkegaard and Jan Patocka. In Politics of Friendship (1997) he tackles the Western canonical
discourse on friendship.
[9] John Caputo describes ‘archi-text’ as
‘various networks – social,
historical, linguistic, political, sexual networks (the list goes on nowadays
to include electronic networks, worldwide webs) – various horizons or
presuppositions…’ Caputo, Deconstruction
in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, Fordham University
Press, 1997, pp. 79–80.
[10] This is a reading, a rewriting, of possibly
Derrida’s most misunderstood, most abused, statement: ‘there is nothing outside
of the text’ (Of Grammatology, p.
158).
[11] See, for instance, Memoirs of the Blind (1993), Circumfession
(1993), On the Name (1995), The Gift of Death (1995), ‘Faith and
Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone’ in J
Derrida and G Vattimo (eds), Religion
(1998), and Monolingualism of the Other
(1998).
[12] Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, Stanford University Press, 2000, p.
29.
[13] Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, University of Chicago Press,
1996, p. 17.
[14] Jacques Derrida, Transcript of seminar
‘Archive Fever’, presented at University of the Witwaters-rand, Johannesburg,
August 1998, to be published in Refiguring
the Archive, David Philip Publishers, South Africa.
[15] This is arguably the core argument of
Derrida’s Archive Fever.
[16] Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age,
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 54.
[17] Quoted and analysed in Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse
and Historical Representation, John Hopkins University Press, 1987, pp.
169–84.
[18] Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, Stanford University Press, 2000, p.
56.
[19] Acknowledgement to Derrida.
[20] Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language,
Pantheon, New York, 1992, p. 129.
[21] Verne Harris is Director of the South African History Archive (SAHA), an independent archive established in the 1980s to document the struggles against apartheid and the continuing struggles for justice in South Africa, using the country’s freedom of information legislation (Promotion of Access to Information Act) that he helped draft to promote access to records. He is also a lecturer in archives for the University of the Witwatersrand’s postgraduate programme in heritage studies. Published widely in the fields of archives, records management, history, music and fiction, he is a frequent international commentator on cases involving ethics and human rights aspects of recordkeeping. Formerly with South Africa’s State Archives Service and deputy director in the National Archives, he has participated in the transformation of South Africa’s apartheid public records system including chairing the working committee of the Consultative Forum that drafted the National Archives of South Africa Act and serving as a member of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s team investigating the destruction of records by the apartheid state. A former editor of the South African Archives Journal, he serves on the editorial boards of the international journals Archival Science, Comma and Esarbica Journal.